University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences - Papers: Part B

Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences

2017

Threat Models for Analyzing Plausible Deniability of Deniable File
Systems
Michal Kedziora
Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, michalk@uow.edu.au

Yang-Wai Chow
University of Wollongong, caseyc@uow.edu.au

Willy Susilo
University of Wollongong, wsusilo@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers1
Part of the Engineering Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Kedziora, Michal; Chow, Yang-Wai; and Susilo, Willy, "Threat Models for Analyzing Plausible Deniability of
Deniable File Systems" (2017). Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences - Papers: Part B. 952.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers1/952

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Threat Models for Analyzing Plausible Deniability of Deniable File Systems
Abstract
Plausible deniability is a property of Deniable File System (DFS), which are encrypted using a Plausibly
Deniable Encryption (PDE) scheme, where one cannot prove the existence of a hidden file system within
it. This paper investigates widely used security models that are commonly employed for analyzing DFSs.
We contend that these models are no longer adequate considering the changing technological landscape
that now encompass platforms like mobile and cloud computing as a part of everyday life. This
necessitates a shift in digital forensic analysis paradigms, as new forensic models are required to detect
and analyze DFSs. As such, it is vital to develop new contemporary threat models that cater for the
current computing environment that incorporates the increasing use of mobile and cloud technology. In
this paper, we present improved threat models for PDE, against which DFS hidden volumes and hidden
operating systems can be analyzed. In addition, we demonstrate how these contemporary threat models
can be adopted to attack and defeat the plausible deniability property of a widely used DFS software.

Keywords
deniable, file, deniability, plausible, systems, analyzing, threat, models

Disciplines
Engineering | Science and Technology Studies

Publication Details
Kedziora, M., Chow, Y. & Susilo, W. (2017). Threat Models for Analyzing Plausible Deniability of Deniable
File Systems. Journal of Software Networking, Online First 241-264.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers1/952

Threat Models for Analyzing Plausible Deniability of
Deniable File Systems
Michal Kedziora1*, Yang-Wai Chow2, Willy Susilo2
1

Faculty of Computer Science and Management, Wroclaw University of Science and
Technology, Wroclaw, Poland
2

Institute of Cybersecurity and Cryptology, School of Computing and Information
Technology, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia
E-mail: michal.kedziora@pwr.edu.pl; {caseyc,wsusilo}@uow.edu.au
*Corresponding author

Abstract.
Plausible deniability is a property of Deniable File System (DFS), which are encrypted
using a Plausibly Deniable Encryption (PDE) scheme, where one cannot prove the
existence of a hidden file system within it. This paper investigates widely used security
models that are commonly employed for analyzing DFSs. We contend that these models
are no longer adequate considering the changing technological landscape that now
encompass platforms like mobile and cloud computing as a part of everyday life. This
necessitates a shift in digital forensic analysis paradigms, as new forensic models are
required to detect and analyze DFSs. As such, it is vital to develop new contemporary
threat models that cater for the current computing environment that incorporates the
increasing use of mobile and cloud technology. In this paper, we present improved threat
models for PDE, against which DFS hidden volumes and hidden operating systems can be
analyzed. In addition, we demonstrate how these contemporary threat models can be
adopted to attack and defeat the plausible deniability property of a widely used DFS
software.
Keywords. Deniable file system, hidden operating system, plausibly deniable encryption,
VeraCrypt.

1.

INTRODUCTION

The underlying notion of deniable encryption is to be able to decrypt a cipher text into two
different plaintexts depending on the key that is provided [1]. The purpose of this is to
protect against adversaries who can force a user to provide a password to decrypt the
cipher text, as the password that is provided will only reveal the decoy message while the
true message remains hidden. An additional requirement in Plausibly Deniable Encryption
(PDE) is to guarantee that the adversary cannot detect the presence of a hidden message in
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the cipher text. This property is known as plausible deniability, as the existence of the
hidden message cannot be proven.
A Deniable File System (DFS) is developed using a PDE scheme, as a file system where
the existence of a portion of it can be hidden from view [2]. An example of such a system
is where a person creates a regular (non-deniable) encrypted file system, which is
protected by a password. Within this file system, the person can also create a DFS that is
protected by a second password. This inner, DFS is referred to as a hidden volume, which
is deniable because unless the person reveals the second password to an adversary, it
should be impossible for that adversary to determine whether the regular encrypted file
system contains an encrypted hidden volume [2].
DFSs can be used for a variety of different purposes. For example, a professional journalist
or human rights worker operating in a region of conflict or oppression may need to hide
sensitive data in a hidden file system. This is to protect the individual from severe
punishment or retribution if the human rights violators were to discover that the individual
has evidence of the atrocities or other sensitive data in their possession [2, 3]. On the other
hand, DFSs can be a double-edged sword as it can be used by criminals or terrorists to hide
secret data from the police or authorities, who may not be able prosecute the criminals due
to being unable to prove the existence of the hidden data.
One of the currently used security models against which DFSs can potentially be secured
was described in Czeskis et al. [2]. According to them, threat models against which hidden
encrypted volumes can potentially be secured are based on three situations: one-time
access, intermittent access and regular access. However, these models were proposed a
number of years ago and there are several issues with them when applied to the modern
day computing landscape, in which platforms like mobile and cloud computing are a part
of everyday life. This necessitates a shift in digital forensic analysis paradigms, as new
forensic models are required to detect and analyze DFSs.
In practice, the security threat models of DFSs should closely relate to the digital forensic
process. There are number of guidelines and procedures used to describe this process [4, 5,
6]. The emergence of ubiquitous mobile devices and operating systems with integrated
backup functions, on-the-fly encryption, mobile and cloud integration, etc. has resulted in
the traditional forensic model becoming increasingly obsolete. The live forensic approach
was introduced as an alternative approach by adding live analysis to forensic procedures
[7]. In addition, PDE on mobile devices is a growing area of research [3, 8, 9]. Considering
the growing mobile and wireless environment, the previous threat models do not address
the requirements of this emerging landscape and thus should be revisited with
improvements.
This paper presents improved threat models for PDE, against which DFS hidden volumes
and hidden operating systems can be analyzed. This is based on our work in Kedziora et al.
[10]. In addition, we demonstrate how these contemporary threat models can be adopted to
attack and defeat the plausible deniability property of VeraCrypt, which is a widely used
DFS software [11, 12].
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2.

BACKGROUND

2.1.

Deniable File Systems

A Deniable File System (DFS) is one where the existence of a portion of the file system
can be hidden from view [2]. DFSs are based on deniable encryption, which was first
introduced by Canetti et al. [1]. Canetti et al. [1] proposed a shared-key encryption
scenario where the sender and receiver share a random secret key to encrypt message,
along with a fake shared key. This allows the encrypted message to be decrypted into two
different plaintexts depending on which key is used. Plausible deniability is the property
where one cannot prove the existence of a hidden message in the cipher text without being
provided with the second key. In Plausible Deniable Encryption (PDE), the assumption is
that it should be impossible to prove that a hidden message exists.
Since its inception, PDE have been adopted in a variety of encrypted file storage schemes.
Oler and Fray [13] discussed a number of concepts of DFSs, including their advantages,
drawbacks and use as a file system for storing sensitive data. Deniable cryptography has
been used for cloud storage. The concept of deniable cloud storage includes the privacy of
data even when one's communication and storage can be opened by an adversary. This was
introduced by Gasti et al. [14], in which they designed a sender-and-receiver deniable
public-key encryption scheme and provided an implementation of a deniable shared file
system for cloud storage. In addition, PDE schemes have also been devised to provide
deniable storage encryption for mobile devices. Examples from the research community on
implementing PDE on mobile platforms include Mobiflage [3], MobiHydra [8] and
MobiPluto [9].
One of the most common DFS software that is used in practice is based on the TrueCrypt
implementation [2]. TrueCrypt is an on-the-fly encryption application, which implements
DFS as hidden volumes that reside within an encrypted volume. While the TrueCypt
project was discontinued in 2014, alternatives exist. For example, VeraCrypt is the most
popular DFS software to date. VeraCrypt is an open source software used for on-the-fly
encryption [11, 15]. It implements PDE in the form of hidden volumes and hidden
operating systems. Its process is user transparent in that data is encrypted right before it is
saved, and decrypted right after it is being loaded, without any user intervention [11]. PDE
software for encrypted and hidden volumes are also available on mobile devices using
mobile applications such as Disk Decipher [16] and Crypto Disks [17].
2.2.

Threat Models for DFSs

Threat models for DFSs were described in Czeskis et al. [2]. In their work, they proposed
threat models against which hidden encrypted volumes can potentially be secured. These
are based on one of three situations:


The first scenario is the One-Time Access scenario. This is when the attacker has
only one copy of the disk image containing a DFS volume. This is the worst-case
scenario. An example of this is when the police seize a device and make a binary
copy of its data.



Their second model is Intermittent Access. According to Czeskis et al. [2], this is
when an attacker has several copies of the evidence volume, taken at different
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times. An example is when border guards make a copy of a person's device every
time the person enters or leaves the country.


The third model is Regular Access. This is when an attacker has several copies of
the evidence data made at short intervals. For example, when the police secretly
enter a person's apartment every day while the person is away and make a copy of
the device's contents each time.

There are several issues with these models when applied to the modern day computing
environment. The purpose of One-Time Access was to focus on a situation where there is a
chance to discover information about a DFS via analysis of its algorithm and
implementation. In addition, it was meant to deal with a situation when a single binary
copy of a hard disk containing a DFS was seized and analyzed. However, this situation
rarely occurs as investigators nowadays can often take a snapshot of the device's RAM
before it is shut down. In addition, current operating systems have features such as
automatic backup functions for important files. As such, a copy of a hard disk typically
contains multiple archived copies of DFS volumes. In common forensic investigations, the
One-Time Access model is severely affected if several copies of the DFS volume exists, as
this encroaches on the Intermittent or Regular Access models.
Furthermore, the Intermittent and Regular Access models both rely on access to multiple
copies of the data. The difference between them is based on the number of copies and the
intervals at which these copies were made. The purpose of these models is based on the
ability to analyze changes both in the DFS and any side channel leaks that these changes
may create. However, the interval in which copies are seized versus the number of copies,
does not play a significant role in investigations to distinguish between these models. In
addition, with the increasing number of copies and automatic backups, which is
characteristic of the modern computing environment, this severely muddles the distinction
between the Intermittent and Regular Access models.
Therefore, the inconsistencies with these traditional threat models result in an inability to
practically employ these models in the current increasingly diverse computing
environment. Moreover, part of the deficiency also lies in the fact that the traditional
models fail to capture the live forensic approach, which has become the commonplace
when handling live access to cloud and mobile data. The current forensic shift is to
analyzes live running systems remotely without shutting them down. This is not captured
in the current threat models and therefore misses important attack vectors on DFSs.

3.

IMPROVED THREAT MODEL

This paper presents improved threat models for the security of DFSs, which addresses the
weaknesses in the models described in Czeskis et al. [2]. This section discusses purpose of
the proposed threat models and presents analysis on their significance to accommodate the
current increasingly diverse computing environment, comprising of ubiquitous systems
like mobile and cloud computing with their associated synchronization and automatic
backup features. The main drawback of the traditional models is that the One-Time Access
model often encroaches on the Intermittent or Regular Access models. Furthermore, there
is little to distinguish between the forensic analysis methods and attack vectors that can be
used for the Intermittent and Regular Access models.
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As such, the proposed approach amalgamates the One-Time Access model with aspects of
the Intermittent and Regular Access models, to form a baseline for single system access.
This is separate from the Multiple Access model which incorporates techniques like
differential analysis. A third model is proposed based on the live forensic approach, which
we call Live Response Access. This not only addresses live forensics, but is also
associated with new types of DFS attacks based on cloud and network integrity of today's
computer systems. Figure 1 depicts the proposed threat models. The proposed model
incorporates the One-Time Access, Multiple Access and Live Response Access models
along with their associated attack vectors respectively.

Figure 1. Threat models and attack vectors on Deniable File Systems (DFSs).
3.1.

One-Time Access

The One-Time Access scenario in the proposed model is where an investigator is able to
access one, or more copies, of a device containing only one copy of the DFS encrypted
container. The most conservative variant of this model is when an investigator is able to
seize and analyze forensic evidence of a binary image of an encrypted DFS volume. Two
common situations are, for example, obtaining a binary copy of a hard drive encrypted
with a DFS implementation like TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt, and retrieving a logical copy of the
DFS encrypted container from a backup system. In either of these situations, the
investigator's options are limited to analyzing the cover volume or the encrypted container
itself.
The security of this is based on the cryptographic algorithm and the assumption that it can
be formally and mathematically proven. However, in practice, DFSs are usually seized as a
container file from a complex operating system. This results in the possibility of new
attack vectors, in addition to the problem of detecting the DFS itself, as DFS
implementations use encryption to hide deniable data together with encrypted cover data.
Hence, all encrypted data found on an evidence device should be treated by the
investigator as containing a DFS unless proven otherwise. While this problem is not
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commonly addressed in DFS related papers, it is very important from a forensic
investigator's point of view. This was not only presented in previous work [18, 19], but
also confirmed in Davies [20], where initial detection techniques are based on statistical
detection of volumes by randomness testing. Statistical tests based on entropy, chi-square,
arithmetic mean, Monte Carlo for Pi and serial correlation coefficient can be used.
The main threat vector for DFS security in the One-Time Access model is information
leakage, which can compromise covert and hidden volumes. Information leakage through
the operating system was introduced in Czeskis et al. [2], where they gave an example of
shortcut files that can point to data on the hidden volume, or copies of hidden volume files
saved in unencrypted area of disk, thus compromising its presence. The second main
vector is in locating keys and password attacks against DFS. DFSs based on
TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt are only as strong as its password, which is a practical problem
when many users do not comply with secure password usage policies. Furthermore, there
are methods of obtaining passwords from the memory of a running DFS volume.
In situations where an investigator can access more than one copy of a DFS volume [21],
and in situations where an investigator can interact with a running system to find
cryptographic keys should be excluded from the One-Time Access threat model. This is
because the former scenario is captured in the Multiple Access model, while in the later is
modelled in the Live Response Access model, which are discussed in the sections to
follow.
3.2.

Multiple Access

A Multiple Access scenario is where an investigator has multiple device images containing
multiple hidden encrypted containers. The main threat to DFSs in this case is differential
analysis of hidden volumes, which can result in the ability to attack the plausible
deniability attribute. This issue was first raised by Czeskis et al. [2], where they
highlighted that if disk snapshots can be obtained at close enough intervals, the existence
of any deniable files will be obvious, since seemingly random bytes on the hard drive will
change. A practical implication of this was presented in Hargreaves and Chivers [21],
where they described how hidden encrypted volumes can be detected and how their sizes
can be estimated. In addition, research on detecting the creation of a DFS inside an
encrypted container was presented in Jozwiak et al. [15].
The Multiple Access model also involves the situation where more than one copy of a
hidden volume can be retrieved from only one seized disk image. An example of this was
presented by Hargreaves and Chivers [21], where they managed to obtain multiple copies
of an encrypted container using the Shadow Copy function in the Windows Vista,
Windows 7 and Windows 10 operating systems. Shadow Copy extends the Restore Point
feature of Windows XP. The Shadow Copy feature is important for finding forensic
artifacts during investigations as demonstrated by Purcell and Lang [22]. This situation is
common in forensic investigations due to the standard usage of automatic backup
functions integrated in modern operation systems including Shadow Copy for Microsoft
Windows and Time Machine for MacOS. The emergence of mobile and cloud computing
with integrated backup also produces a source for obtaining multiple copies of DFS
containers.
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3.3.

Live Response Access

We define a new model for capturing the scenario where investigators have live access to
data through a network. We refer to this as the Live Response Access model. Three main
example scenarios for this model are where an investigator/attacker has:


Direct/remote live access to the hosting Operating System (OS) running a DFS
volume



Direct/remote live access to DFS based hidden OS



Access to the network environment within which a hidden OS is running, or has
access to the cloud application in which the hidden OS is connected to

When Czeskis et al. [2] introduced their threat models against which a DFS could
potentially be secured, forensics procedures typically involved the switching-off of
computers and making a binary copy of the hard drive. Nowadays, much more effort is
directed and focused towards live forensics, whereby the main idea is to preserve volatile
data that is mostly lost if a computer or mobile device were to be switched off [23]. Live
response and memory analysis tools have the capabilities of collecting information from a
variety of sources including network connections, opened ports and sockets, running
processes, terminated processes, loaded Dynamic-Linked Libraries (DLLs), opened files,
OS kernel modules, process dumps, and strings or user logs [24]. Each of these
information sources can lead to compromising the presence of a DFS by identifying a
hidden volume disk area.
Although most of these techniques can also be used in the One-Time Access model, as
volatile forensic artifacts related to hidden DFS volumes can be found in temporary system
files as swap or hibernation files, it is more appropriate to extend these to the Live
Response Access model. This is because it can lead to the scenario where an investigator
has access to the host system, a common situation nowadays, which can generate new
approaches and threats to DFS security.
A scenario that was ignored in previous models is securing a DFS when an investigator or
an attacker has access to the hidden volume or the hidden OS while it is running. The
reason why this scenario was ignored is because a DFS is assumed to have secure
encryption. However, this situation has changed with the hidden OS option when using an
implementation like TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt. As such, the Live Response Access model
embraces the scenario where investigators can remotely use live response tools to directly
access a running DFS OS. In practice, this can be achieved using remote access via
software like Team Viewer, VNC, Windows Remote Desktop or just physical access to the
device. Another scenario is the running of the hidden OS in a networked environment with
the need to connect to third party mobile and cloud applications. This results in new
possibilities for detecting the presence of a DFS based on live access to the DFS that is
currently in use.

4.

DEFEATING PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

In this section, we demonstrate how the proposed threat models can be used in practice to
defeat plausible deniability of a VeraCrypt hidden Operating System (OS) [12]. A hidden
OS is an operating system installed in an encrypted hidden volume, using software such as
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VeraCrypt. This feature was implemented in TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt software as an
extension of DFSs [25].
4.1.

VeraCrypt Hidden Operating System

VeraCrypt uses XTS mode for encrypting partitions, drives and virtual volumes [11]. This
mode of operation is described by Equation 1, where ⨂ denotes multiplication of two
polynomials over the binary field GF(2) modulo x128 + x7 + x2 + 1; ^ denotes an XOR
operation; K1 is the encryption key; K2 is the secondary encryption key; i is the cipher
block index within a data unit; n is the data unit index within the scope of K1; and a is the
primitive element of Galois Field (2128) that corresponds to polynomial x [11]. This implies
that a change in one bit of the plaintext will result in a change to the entire 8-bytes (128
bits) data block of the encrypted volume.
ܥ = ܧଵ ቀܲ ^ሺܧଶ ሺ݊ሻ⨂ܽ ሻቁ ^ሺܧଶ ሺ݊ሻ⨂ܽ ሻ

(1)

The VeraCrypt documentation provides a guide on how to encrypt a hidden OS [11]. A
practical implementation consists of two partitions and a boot loader residing in the first
track of a system drive (or a VeraCrypt RescueDisk). However, this is not a smart solution
as the unencrypted boot loader will indicate that the drive is encrypted by VeraCrypt. To
overcome this issue there is an option to create a VeraCrypt rescue disk containing the
boot loader, as depicted in Figure 2. This will provide plausible deniability as a decoy OS
can be created. Obviously, the system installed on the first partition must not contain any
sensitive files.

Figure 2. Example layout of a drive containing a VeraCrypt hidden OS.
The second partition is also encrypted and can be mounted by the user upon supplying the
second password. The outer volume contains an integrated hidden volume within which
the hidden OS is installed. Existence of the hidden volume, which is a DFS, cannot be
proven via One-Time Access methods (previously described in section 3.1). To access the
hidden OS, the user must provide the valid password that is different from the decoy OS
volume's password. The boot loader will first try to decrypt the decoy OS's header, and
after it is unsuccessful, it will then attempt to decrypt the hidden OS's header. What is
important is that when running, the hidden OS will appear to be installed on the same
partition as the decoy OS. All read/write operations will be transparently redirected from
the system partition to the hidden volume inside the outer volume. The VeraCrypt
documentation asserts that neither the OS nor any application programs will know that all
data is essentially written to and read from the hidden volume [11]. We demonstrate that
the above statement is not entirely true, as the presence of the hidden OS can in fact be
revealed.
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4.2.

Test Environment

A test environment was created using Oracle Virtual Box version 5.1.12. A hard drive
image size of 50GB was created. However, since the virtual box operates using the Virtual
Disk Image (VDI) file format with included metadata, its image had to be converted to a
binary RAW format before analysis using computer forensic tools. Both the decoy and
hidden OS (MS Windows 10) where installed using VeraCrypt 1.19. The designed layout
of the partitions is depicted in Table 1.
Partition

Starting Sector

Last Sector

Size (MB)

/dev/sda1

2048

1026047

500

/dev/sda2

1026047

43530239

20270

/dev/sda3

43532225

104855551

29240

/dev/sda5

43532288

104855355

29240

Unallocated

104855552

104857599

1

Table 1: Layout of the partitions in the test environment.
The first partition, /dev/sda1, was for the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) and
was unencrypted. The second partition, /dev/sda2, was the one on which the decoy
operating system was installed; the whole partition was encrypted. /dev/sda3 was the
extended partition that hosts the /dev/sda5/ partition, which was the completely encrypted
outer volume; the hidden OS was installed within this partition. As the hidden OS was
contained within the encrypted hidden volume, which was located inside the encrypted
outer volume, plausible deniability necessitates that it should be impossible to prove the
existence of this hidden OS. However, in the next section, we show that plausible
deniability of the VeraCrypt hidden OS is not met even in the simplest threat model
scenario.
4.3.

Encrypted Drive Analysis

First, we investigated the possibility of defeating plausible deniability of a VeraCrypt
hidden OS under the most basic thread scenario, i.e. the One-Time Access scenario. An
example of such a scenario is when Alice’s computer is seized by police, who force Alice
to reveal the password of the encrypted partitions. Alice reveals the password for the decoy
OS and for the outer volume. According to the plausible deniability attribute of the
VeraCrypt hidden OS, the police should not be able to prove that Alice has a hidden OS
installed on the computer, as it is stored in an encrypted hidden volume inside the
encrypted outer volume.
A VeraCrypt hidden OS requires a special uncommon disk layout consisting of at least two
partitions that are both completely encrypted. This information, in conjunction with the
fact that VeraCrypt is installed on the computer under investigation, can potentially raise
the suspicion of the police to the presence of a hidden OS. Nevertheless, this can
reasonably be explained by Alice as the need to separate the system and documents into
separate partitions. However, any solid indication that a hidden OS is installed on the
computer under investigation is sufficient to defeat plausible deniability.
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We conducted randomness testing to check for artifacts in the outer volume. The reason
for this is because if a hidden OS is running inside a completely encrypted hidden volume
that is located within an outer volume, which is also completely encrypted, no pseudorandom anomalies should be found. When we performed entropy analysis on the outer
volume, it showed that most of the examined data had values between 7.9978 and 7.9986,
which represent expected values from correctly encrypted cipher text data. However, we
were able to observe some unexpected values in specific sectors that were occupied by the
outer volume. In particular, there were two areas which clearly showed significantly lower
entropy values of 7.9966 and 7.997, as can be seen in the plot provided in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Areas with significantly lower entropy inside the outer encrypted volume.
The first of these observed areas was located in sector number 61345696, and the second
was located 45928448 bytes later in sector number 61435400. Both of these sectors are
located within the /dev/sda5 partition, which was within the completely encrypted outer
volume. The hidden volume hosting the hidden OS had a size of 42504191 sectors. This
could infer that the lower entropy areas indicate the beginning and end of the hidden
volume hosting the hidden OS. The presence of these lower entropy areas violates the
plausible deniability of the existence of a VeraCrypt hidden OS.
Both areas are exactly 512 bytes in length and consist of “00” bytes and strings, and the
path to the “\windows\system32\winload.exe” file, refer to Figure 4. Cross drive analysis
showed that the second area correlates to the running of the hidden OS. Three bytes at
offset 61435400 are altered every time the hidden OS is started. This is highlighted in
Figure 4, the bytes 90 90 00 change to CD 1E 01 whenever the hidden OS is started. A
VeraCrypt ciphertext block size is 16 bytes (128 bits), this indicates that this area is not
overwritten by the VeraCrypt encryption algorithm.

11

Figure 4. Lower entropy areas.
In summary, an investigator can easily find these areas in a One-Time Access threat model
scenario. The presence of these areas is correlated with the existence of a hidden OS, and
thus violates the plausible deniability attribute of a VeraCrypt hidden OS. Furthermore, if
an investigator is able to compare this area with binary snapshots taken over an interval of
time (i.e. in the case of a Multiple Access model), this can provide strong evidence as to
the running of a hidden OS on the computer.
4.4.

Cross Drive Analysis

In this section, we demonstrate a method of defeating plausible deniability of a VeraCrypt
hidden OS in the case of a Multiple Access threat model. This scenario assumes that an
investigator is in possession of multiple binary copies of Alice’s computer hard drive that
were taken over several time intervals during which Alice was using either the decoy OS
or the hidden OS. This method has previously been used in DFSs for detecting the
existence of TrueCrypt hidden volumes on a drive under investigation [21]. Our research
adopts this method for detecting the presence of a VeraCrypt hidden OS.
First, we split the binary images of the investigated drives into 1000MB blocks. Then the
SHA-1 cryptographic hash of each block was computed. This was done under the
assumption that this will help narrow down the analysis from a 50GB image to smaller
parts of the drive where data actually changes, which was true in the case of analyzing
TrueCrypt hidden volumes [19]. It turns out that running a VeraCrypt OS’s “on the fly”
encryption (even when the OS is idle) writes large amounts of data, which distributes
changes over the whole system partition. VeraCrypt statistics estimate that 17, 33, and 520
MBs of data written on an encrypted volume correspond to 1 minute, 2 minute and 5
minute intervals [11]. Analysis of the cryptographic hash function values clearly showed
that mismatched blocks in the case of running the decoy OS are placed in the first half of
the investigated drive image. This is in contrast to the running of the hidden OS, which
changes only the second half of the drive image.
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We performed a detailed comparison of changes in each corresponding data block, and a
visual depiction of this is presented in Figure 5. In Figure 5, every rectangle represents a
1000MB block of the binary image from the investigated drive (except for the last block
which is 200MB in size). The first block is on the upper left, while the last block is on the
lower right. The data that changed during the running of the decoy and hidden OSs are
depicted as the horizontal gray lines.
The experiment started with the creation of the binary images of the investigated drive
containing both the installed decoy and hidden OSs. Then, virtual machines were cloned,
switched on and immediately turned off for the decoy OS and a second clone for the
hidden OS. While running the decoy OS, only data on the second portion changed,
whereas running the hidden OS only resulted in changes in the outer volume, which is
located in the third partition. Analyzing the first change sector offset (62351360) and the
last sector (103601344) allows for an estimation of the hidden OS partition size. In the
case of the experiment, it was estimated as 19.7GB, which compares favorably with the
actual hidden OS partition size of 20.26GB. It is assumed that a more accurate estimation
can be made if we allowed the OSs to operate for some time, rather than simply switching
it on and off.
In summary, this demonstrates that cross drive analysis can uncover evidence that a hidden
OS is running on a drive under investigation, based on an analysis of changes made to the
encrypted drive.

Figure 5. A visual depiction of the changes that VeraCrypt made to the volume while
running the decoy OS (on the left) and the hidden OS (on the right).
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4.5.

Other Attack Vectors

Hidden OSs are by design intended to ensure plausible deniability, especially in the case of
a One-Time Access model. In the previous section, we demonstrated that they are
vulnerable to Multiple Access attacks. In this section, we discuss attack vectors based on
the Live Response Access scenario. This is based on the situation where an investigator
has live access to the running hidden OS or to the network/cloud environment within
which the hidden OS is operating. Our purpose is to reveal any information that can lead to
proving that either a decoy or a hidden OS is running. Despite information provided in the
VeraCrypt documentation that asserts that neither the OS nor any application programs
will know that all data is essentially written to and read from the hidden volume [11], we
discovered that even non-privilege level applications can reveal some information that can
be used to detect a hidden OS.
Right after logging into the hidden OS, a pop-up message informing the user that “for
security reasons, when a hidden operating system is running, local unencrypted file
systems and non-hidden VeraCrypt volumes are mounted as read-only”, which gives away
the fact that the system is running a hidden OS. This pop-up message is shown in Figure 6.
In addition, when configuration files located in the %APPDATA%\VeraCrypt\ folder from
both the decoy and hidden OSs were compared, there is a configuration key named
“HiddenSystemLeakProtNotifStatus” that was initially set to “1”, while no such key exists
in the decoy OS's configuration file. There is an option to disable the pop-up message.
However, upon disabling this message, the configuration key value will change to “2”.
This is simple proof that the hidden OS is running. Moreover, when comparing the
configurations files, there are clear differences. The hidden OS’s configuration file has 58
lines, whereas by default, the decoy OS's configuration file only has 10. While this by
itself cannot be treated as hard evidence, it potentially leaks information.

Figure 6: Pop-up message displayed while launching a VeraCrypt hidden OS.
Another indication that a hidden OS is running can be obtained from mounted volume
information that the user can retrieve from the VeraCrypt GUI. By default, a decoy OS
runs from an encrypted volume named “System partition” with type “System”, whereas a
hidden OS runs from a volume mounted with the name “Hidden system partition” with
type “Hidden”. This is shown in Figure 7 (a) and (b) respectively. Even a standard user
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account is able to obtain this information. If an investigator has administrative rights, it is
highly likely that additional information can be obtained by analyzing processes and drives
on the kernel.

(a)

(b)
Figure 7: VeraCrypt GUI when working on (a) the hidden OS; (b) the decoy OS.
Another class of attack is based on network/cloud environment information leaks. Modern
operating systems are enhanced by default in cloud based mechanisms to make work easier
for the user. An example of this is the Microsoft account that involves signing into one
account for all devices. This information and the number of login attempts are recorded
and stored on user account information which can easily be accessed. In our tests, we also
checked the Apple ID, which is used to log into Apple's iCloud as well as Google's single
sign on account.
The use of both the decoy and hidden OSs is visible in the account logs and this can be an
easy way to prove that another OS is installed on the device by simply observing that two
OSs are registered and used concurrently on the same device. Combining this information
with forensic analysis indicating that only one OS is present on the device and that the
drive structure is capable of running a DFS hidden OS, can be used to prove the existence
of a hidden OS. Similar attacks can be performed by comparing browser fingerprints.
These types of web tracking techniques are described in Acar et al. [26] and Fifield et al.
[27]. We conducted a series of tests which confirm that this method can indeed be used to
reveal the presence of a hidden OS.
Information that can compromise the existence of a hidden OS can also be obtained from
monitoring device network traffic. An attacker can use both passive and active OS
identification techniques. As with cloud based information leaks, these techniques can
easily reveal the existence of a hidden OS if the user runs different OS types. Techniques
for detecting hidden OSs can also include forensic analysis of decoy OSs by indexing
application versions and network services and comparing these with intercepted network
traffic. Any unusual traffic from the same IP and MAC, but with applications and services
not present in the decoy OS can lead to the conclusion that a hidden OS must be installed
on the device.
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5.

CONCLUSION

This paper describes commonly used threat models against which Deniable File Systems
(DFSs) can potentially be secured. However, with the advancements and progress of
modern computer systems that include the integration of mobile and cloud solutions, the
existing threat models are increasingly becoming obsolete. New threat models, namely, the
One-Time Access, Multiple Access and Live Response Access models were analyzed and
discussed. These improved threat models should supersede previous models as they
provide greater coverage of security issues faced by DFSs and hidden operating systems.
In view of the increasing likelihood of investigators being able to access several copies of
DFS volumes during investigations, this issue should be addressed by adopting new
precautions or improving encryption algorithms to make it harder to perform cross data
analysis, which has emerged as a major threat to the security of DFSs. In addition, we also
introduce a model to cater for the increasingly common scenario where investigators have
live access to the user’s device through a network or other means. This paper also
demonstrates practical examples of how these new models can be used to defeat plausible
deniability of DFSs with a hidden operating system.
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